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Abstract. There is an enduring story about empiricism, which runs as
follows: from Locke onwards to Carnap, empiricism is the doctrine in
which raw sense-data are received through the passive mechanism of
perception; experience is the effect produced by external reality on the
mind or ‘receptors’. Empiricism on this view is the ‘handmaiden’ of
experimental natural science, seeking to redefine philosophy and its
methods in conformity with the results of modern science. Secondly,
there is a story about materialism, popularized initially by Marx and
Engels and later restated as standard, ‘textbook’ history of philosophy
in the English-speaking world. It portrays materialism as explicitly
mechanistic, seeking to reduce the world of qualities, sensations, and
purposive behaviour to a quantitative, usually deterministic physical
scheme. Building on some recent scholarship, I aim to articulate the
contrarian view according to which neither of these stories is true. On
the contrary, empiricism turns out to be less ‘science-friendly’ and
more concerned with moral matters; materialism reveals itself to be,
in at least a large number of cases, a ‘vital’, anti-mechanistic doctrine
which focuses on the unique properties of organic beings. This
revision of two key philosophical episodes should reveal that our
history of early modern philosophy is dependent to a great extent on
‘special interests’, whether positivistic or Kantian, and by extension
lead us to rethink the relation and distinction between ‘science’ and
‘philosophy’ in this period.
Keywords: revision of empiricism, revision of materialism, science
and philosophy, early modern thought
There is an enduring and influential story about empiricism, popularized in the early
twentieth century by philosophers like A.J. Ayer and Bertrand Russell, and targeted just as
strongly by other philosophers such as Edmund Husserl. The story runs as follows: from
Locke onwards to Carnap, empiricism is the doctrine in which raw sense-data are received
through the passive mechanism of perception; experience is the effect produced by external
reality on the mind or ‘receptors’.1 By extension, empiricism is the ‘handmaiden’ of
experimental natural science, seeking to redefine philosophy and its methods in conformity
with the results of modern science. Secondly, there is an equally enduring story about
materialism, popularized initially by Marx and Engels and later restated as standard,
‘textbook’ history of philosophy in the English-speaking world to this day. It portrays
1Taylor (1964), p. 92. See also Nagel (2006).
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materialism as explicitly mechanistic, seeking to reduce the world of qualities, sensations, and
purposive behaviour to a quantitative, usually deterministic physical scheme. Building on
some recent scholarship, I aim to articulate the contrarian view according to which neither of
these  stories  is  true.  On  the  contrary,  empiricism turns  out  to  be  less  ‘science-friendly’  and
more concerned with moral matters; materialism reveals itself to be, in at least a large number
of cases, a ‘vital’, anti-mechanistic doctrine which focuses on the unique properties of organic
beings.
In what follows I take up, piecemeal, some well-known cases or representative
‘samples’ of what we think of as ‘canonical’ empiricism and materialism – in order to present
a contrarian view of the canon. Not by suggesting, as people intelligently do, that it should be
broadened or widened, by including different kinds of figures, narratives or practices.2 But
rather, by suggesting that the canonical figures did not quite think what we thought they
thought, or at least what we often hear they thought. My main revisionary points would be,
first,  that  empiricism  is  not  a  sense-data  theory  or  the  handmaiden  of  science  but  a moral
theory, and, second, that materialism is not ‘mechanistic’ but in several significant cases
biologistic or indeed, vitalistic. Obviously one might respond with suspicion at this point:
notably because some of this revision also affects the standard distinction between empiricism
and rationalism, so important not just in our teaching modern philosophy but in our
understanding of basic philosophical positions (in the sense that Plato is said to provide anti-
empiricist  arguments,  or  that  Hegel  is  a  particularly  pure  form  of  rationalist).  We  are
accustomed to use ‘empiricism’ and ‘rationalism’ not just as constructs or suggested historico-
theoretical categories, but as proper ways of describing thinkers like Locke-Berkeley-Hume
versus Descartes-Spinoza-Leibniz, proper ways of distinguishing between two epistemologies
and two metaphysics, each with their weaknesses, which are ultimately resolved in a grand
synthesis with Kant, who is a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist. This view goes
back  at  least  as  far  as  Friedrich  Lange’s History of Materialism in  the  19th century; it is
represented today by Jonathan Bennett (as recently as his Learning from Six Philosophers,
2001), and still predominates in most early modern philosophy textbooks.3
If there is something wrong with how the terms ‘empiricism’ and ‘materialism’ are used
as descriptors of historical phases of philosophy, and the remedy isn’t just to nominalistically
dissolve categories in order to focus on specific, incredibly minute facts or sentences, then
what does it mean, or did it mean, to be an empiricist, or a materialist?
1. Empiricism in the history of modern philosophy and a revised view
One might speak of a received view or a mainstream view of empiricism, which is the
following: a doctrine about knowledge as founded on sense-data impacting on a passive, blank
slate or tabula rasa – and by extension, about the construction of scientific theories. This view
may exist, e.g. in the twentieth century, notably with Russell and Carnap (who extended it to
mean a theory – indeed, the theory – about the genesis of scientific statements through a
2 I have tried to pursue the latter kind of ‘canon-extending’ project in my dissertation (Wolfe [2006]),
where I focus on the English deist and disciple of Locke, Anthony Collins in order to show how his
version of determinism significantly changes the picture we should have of this ‘theory’ in early
modern philosophy; see also Wolfe (2007).
3 E.g. Thomson (2002) or Ariew and Watkins, eds. (2000), both of which present the choice in
seventeenth and early eighteenth century philosophy as being one between rationalism and empiricism,
each of which have their aporias, which will be resolved by Kant. Similarly, Markie (2008) – an entry
in a major reference source – begins by stating, “The dispute between rationalism and empiricism
concerns the extent to which we are dependent upon sense experience in our effort to gain knowledge.”
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process of deduction beginning with sense-data4), but neither of the canonical empiricist
philosophers, Locke or Hume, held it. Indeed, the idea that this view belongs to a ‘school’
known as the British Empiricists has met with its own challenges. In recent years, several
important scholars, including Michael Ayers and David Norton, have picked apart the label
‘British empiricism’. The only true empiricist, it seems, in the sense of a thinker who holds
that nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, is a Continental thinker, Pierre Gassendi;
there is almost no continuity of ideas or reading between Locke, Berkeley and Hume (instead,
they read Gassendi, Malebranche, and Bayle); as to the inherent ‘Britishness’ of this label, it
seems that Locke is the only English thinker therein (Berkeley is Irish, Hume Scottish).5
Jonathan Rée has suggested that the idea of British empiricism, which goes back to Reid and
Kant, became so popular because it was claimed to be a ‘national’ tradition for Britain; but if
we think of the Cambridge Platonists, this tradition could just as well be idealism.6
However, my reasons for being a contrarian or revisionist about ‘British empiricism’
are not purely contextual ones involving affinity groups or chains of influence. For one could
always reject that line of argument and declare ‘no matter what Locke or Hume studied, which
Jesuit manual influenced them, whether Locke formulated the first draft of his thoughts on
how we are hedonistically determined by the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain
while under Gassendist influence in Montpellier in 1676; what counts is the core of the
philosophy itself, and it is clear that this philosophy declares that knowledge begins in sense-
experience…’. Instead, I want to point out that our heavily epistemological reading of these
canonical texts might be slanted. If we want to do any justice to what empiricism might have
meant, we would have to extricate ourselves fromwhat Knud Haakonssen recently termed the
‘epistemological paradigm’, whichsees philosophy as essentially concerned with the
justification of beliefs and judgements; it understands such justification in terms of events,
whether perceptive or inferential, in the mind – or, as if in the mind – of the individual person;
and  it  tends  to  apply  this  idea  of  epistemological  justification  as  the  criterion  for  what  is
properly included in the discipline of philosophy.7
In a nutshell, careful investigation of some of these ‘founding texts’ would reveal that
what is epistemological and what is moral are not separated the way we might imagine.
Let’s turn to the texts under consideration.
To historians and philosophers of science, one of the single most famous passages in
Locke’s Essay is in the Epistle to the Reader:
I  shall  always  have  the  satisfaction  to  have  aimed  sincerely  at  truth  and  usefulness,
though in one of the meanest ways. The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without
master-builders, whose mighty designs in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting
monuments to the admiration of posterity; but every one must not hope to be a Boyle, or a
4 In addition to the historical problems with this ‘sense-data’ picture of empiricism, it also suffers from
celebrated philosophical problems, diagnosed at least as far back as Quine’s ‘two dogmas’, which did
not target empiricism as a whole but rather the Carnapian version; and Quine’s anti-foundationalism
(expressed in his fondness for Neurath’s image of the mariner who has to rebuild his boat while afloat
on it; Quine [1969], pp. 82-84) is precisely in synch with the Lockean denial that we have access to any
‘essence’ of nature, its laws or kinds.
5 See Norton (1981), pp. 334, 341; Ayers (1991), vol. 1, p. 15; (1998), p. 1019. Ayers already
challenges the idea of ‘the rationalist’ as opposed to ‘the empiricist’ in his (1968), p. 56f. Ishiguro
(1986) has also argued that the distinction between rationalism and empiricism is unhelpful in
understanding Leibniz and Hume on causation. Auroux (1974) argues that the categories of rationalism
and empiricism are not adequate to explain a thinker like Condillac.
6 Point made by Rée (1997), p. 44.
7 Haakonssen (2006).
ANNALES	PHILOSOPHICI,	Issue	1/2010	
113
Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters, as the great — Huygenius, and the
incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain; it is ambition enough to be
employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the
rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge (emphasis mine).8
The ‘under-labourer’ passage has had an enormous impact on how Locke is viewed.
For  it  seems  to  define  the  empiricist  project  as  an  adjacent,  indeed  subaltern  project  to  the
modern corpuscular reductive project (although the extent to which Boyle and Sydenham can
be fit into the same programmatic box is a debated one). On this view, Locke will treat the
world of ideas as these great men treated the world of natural objects.9
But let’s turn to another passage, also in the Epistle to the Reader, which is less well-
known to scientifically/ontologically/epistemologically inclined readers of Locke.
Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six
friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found
themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while
puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed
us, it came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves
upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what
objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with (emphasis mine).10
What’s the secret here – the “remote subject” on which “five or six friends meeting at
[Locke’s] chamber,” discoursed? A copy of the Essay owned by one of these five or six
friends,  James  Tyrrell,  bears  in  the  margin,  at  this  spot,  the  words  “morality and revealed
religion”11 …  In  other  words,  the  project  of  the Essay has very little to do with empiricist
epistemology and a lot to do with practical matters. Nor is it an ontology, which is why Locke
often says that the relevant area of inquiry for him is not the “depths of the ocean of Being”
but rather “matters concerning our conduct”; “Our Business here is not to know all things, but
those which concern our Conduct” (Essay, I.i.6).
Or,  in  a  draft  of  a  letter  to  Tyrrell,  “my  business  was  only  to  show whence  men  had
moral ideas, and what they were . . .”12 – and their limits. The ‘moral’ Locke is also the proto-
8 Locke (1975), p. 9.
9 Thus Laudan descibes Locke’s epistemology as that of a “life-long scientist” (Laudan [1981], p. 54).
Gaukroger (2007) notes that the underlabourer figure is almost a trope in the works of the period, and
quotes Boyle, who is willing to “not only be an Underbuilder, but ev’n dig in the Quarries for Materials
towards so useful a Structure, as a solid body of Natural Philosophy, than not to do something towards
the erection of it.”: Certain physiological essays and other tracts (London, 1669), p. 18.
10 Locke (1975), p. 7.
11Cranston (1957/1985), pp. 140.141. The manuscript of the Essay with Tyrrell’s marginal annotations
is now in the British Museum. Note that Tyrrell’s account has been challenged, in a rather tortuous
alternate account of the genesis of the Essay, in a series of essays by Patrick Romanell (Romanell 1984,
esp. 148-149, and 203, n. 66). It may well be that Tyrrell misremembered the meeting of Locke’s
friends. But Romanell’s main claim – that the key issue, the “remote subject,” was medicine, and that
medicine structures all of Locke’s thought – is extremely implausible, at best; his secondary claim, that
Locke’s ‘historical, plain method’ derives from the idea of ‘medical histories’ (ibid., 144-147, 192-203,
n. 56) is at best a thin analogy or association of ideas, the evidence for which includes ‘facts’ such as
Locke’s usage of the adjective ‘plain’ to describe Sydenham’s method of treating smallpox. For a more
sophisticated version of the view that Locke’s empiricism is influenced by medicine, see Duchesneau
(1973), 136f.
12 Locke to Tyrrell, August 4th 1690, quoted by Cranston (1957/1985), pp. 334-335. The “Power”
chapter closes with a similar comment: “my present purpose being only to enquire into the knowledge
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critical Locke, that is, the one who wants to restrict our investigation to what we can know.
Look back to the end of the second quotation: the goal is to “examine our own abilities, and
see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with.” Not just a mapping
out of the mind, but a taking stock of its abilities and limitations, so we don’t try and do
something beyond our forces. Not ‘pre-critical’ but ‘proto-critical’! Indeed, when Kant
distinguished between dogmatic and critical philosophy in the first of his lectures on logic in
1770, he named Locke as an example of the latter.13 Locke’s biographer Maurice Cranston
comments that “there is something alien to empiricism in Locke’s whole aim of determining
in advance the limits of human knowledge.”14
Given the choice between these two hints on how to interpret Locke’s vast Essay – the
‘under-labourer’ and the ‘remote subject’ – without wanting to sound like a Straussian reader
of texts who always has to privilege a hidden meaning, I think in this case the hint provided in
the margins of Tyrrell’s copy of the Essay is more important than the piece of positivistic,
Scientific Revolution propaganda. For Locke to say in print that he is just the under-labourer
for people like Boyle, Huygens and Newton makes good sense in terms of public relations; his
hint, without naming the issue, that the whole book revolves around the problem of morality
and religion, says something more. Furthermore, the ‘under-labourer’ picture suggests a kind
of naturalization of the mind which isn’t really part of Locke’s program (not that he rejects it
out of hand): “I shall not at present meddle with the Physical consideration of the Mind”
(Essay, I.i.2). The corpuscularian hypothesis about the nature of underlying reality is, Locke
thinks, the best bet for a valid explanation, but it is not his business!15
One can contrast Locke on this issue with figures such as Toland or Hartley, who are
materialists. For Toland, “Whatever be the Principle of Thinking in Animals, yet it cannot be
perform’d but by the means of the Brain”; he explicitly says thought is a property of the
brain.16 Hartley’s more unwieldy theory has both a general materialist outlook (“By the
mechanism of human actions I mean, that each action results from the previous circumstances
of body and mind,  in  the same manner and with the same certainty as  other  effects  do from
their mechanical causes”) and a specifically ‘vibratory’ materialist account of mind: small
vibrations (“vibrunticles”) are impressed in the solid filaments of the nerves by external
objects; these sensations are transmitted by ætherial vibration to the infinitesimal particles that
make up the substance of the brain. By their differences in degree, kind and place, these
vibrations represent different primary sensations, or “simple ideas” in the brain, which can
become complex ideas through associations with other chains of vibrations.17
If we take the example of another celebrated empiricist, Hume, what is the textbook,
mainstream version and what the ‘revisionist’ version proposed here? Hume is, of course, an
epistemological skeptic. For most people, especially historians and philosophers of science,
the Treatise of Human Nature ends at Book I. Hume denies famously that there is nothing in
any object, consider’d in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond
the Mind has of Things, by those Ideas, and Appearances, which God has fitted to receive from them”
(§ 73).
13 See Haakonssen (2006), p. 10 & n. 17.
14Cranston (1957/1985), p. 265.
15 However, see Locke (1975), II.ii.2, vii.10, and viii.11 (bodies produce ideas in us by ‘impulses’).
Metaphysically, corpuscularian explanations play a key role in Locke’s definition of qualities (i.e.
solidity is a primary quality since it still exists at the corpuscular level); biologically, they play a key
role in what he assumes would be a correct theory of generation, explaining both similarity of traits and
the occasional appearance of ‘monsters’.
16 Respectively, Toland (1704/1976), letter IV, § 7, p. 139 and Toland (1720), p. 15.
17 Hartley (1749), I, p. 500; ibid., pp. 13-16. See Guerlac (1977), p. 162; Yolton (1983), pp. 180-184;
Smith (1987), p. 124.
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it; That even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have
no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had
experience.18
and asserts that
all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv’d from nothing but custom;
and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our
natures.19
The ultimate resolution for Hume, once philosophy has destroyed our access to the
world, so that he “begins to fancy [himself] in the most deplorable condition imaginable,
inviron’d with the deepest darkness, utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty,”
is to return to the backgammon table:
I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends ; and
when … I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous,
that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther.20
In a nutshell, what looks like the dark night of epistemological skepticism and despair
at the end of Book I – but which has also given us such rich philosophy of science in the 20th
century! – is not Hume’s final word, at all. The self and our relation, if not to the external
world as such, but to others, returns with a vengeance in the moral analysis of book II: the
passions, and sympathy (not to mention the analysis of justice in book III). This is how one
returns to the backgammon table. Never does Hume deny that there is a unified self; in the
section on personal identity of the Treatise he denies that when we look into ourselves, we can
have an impression of the self. The bundle theory, or his ‘atomism’ in general, applies to the
elements of our mental processes. Hume was the first – in the Appendix to the Treatise – to
find this account of personal identity inadequate.21
In many ways Hume is a critic of empiricism: consider, notably, his inferentialism
(“there is nothing in any object, consider’d in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing
a conclusion beyond it”), which is a rejection of the Myth of the Given. Similarly, far from
being in any literal sense the ‘Newton of the moral sciences’ that he is often claimed to be, his
type of argument is essentially moral and historical. As Dario Perinetti puts it, “Empirical
generalizations, or as Hume calls them, ‘general rules’ or ‘maxims’, are essentially guiding
principles influencing our judgment after the model of maxims found in the writings of
moralists and historians of the period,”22 rather than expressions of laws of nature or inductive
scientific observations.
Similarly, thinking back to Locke, it seems odd for someone Russell or Charles Taylor
would call an empiricist, to declare that we do not know things directly but only through the
mediation of ideas (Essay IV.iv.3). Of course, if there is something essential in Locke which
is alien to empiricism, and something in Hume which is also alien to (this picture of)
empiricism, maybe it’s our picture of empiricism that needs changing! Of course, this revision
is not meant to cover all forms of early modern empiricism; so, for instance, the
‘experimental’ flavor we associate with this tradition is alive and well in the Royal Society
version of the story, which may be the context in which an actual ‘philosophy of experiment’
18 Hume (1739/2000), I.iii.12, p. 95.
19Ibid., I.iv.1, p. 123.
20Ibid., I.iv.7, “Conclusion of this book,” p. 175.
21 Norton (1981), p. 339.
22 Perinetti (2005), p. 16.
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emerges,  as  in  Robert  Boyle’s  “There  is  a  big  difference  betwixt  the  being  able  to  make
Experiments, and the being able to give a Philosophical Account of them”23 or Bacon’s
“Founding a real model of the world . . . cannot be done without dissecting and anatomizing
the world.”24 It is not to say, then, that empiricism was not concerned with experience, or
specifically sense-experience, or the relation of the information we obtain therein to claims
about nature and the world such as those made in natural philosophy; but rather, that as a
philosophical project empiricism was much more of a ‘human’, ‘moral’, ‘embedded’ science
or intellectual venture, than it was an attempt to produce an epistemology that would do for
the world of the mind what a Newton did for the world of nature.
What of materialism?
2. Materialism and the official story
Here is a story, or perhaps the (official) story about materialism. In the late nineteenth
century, it was told thus by Engels:
The materialism of the past century was predominantly mechanistic, because at that
time . . .  only the science of mechanics . . .  had reached any sort of completion. . .  .  For the
materialists of the eighteenth century, man was a machine. This exclusive application of the
standards of mechanics to processes of a chemical and organic nature – in which the laws of
mechanics are also valid, but are pushed into the background by other, higher laws –
constitutes the specific (and at that time, inevitable) limitation of classical French
materialism.25
 and stated in very similar terms more recently, in an article on Diderot and
D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie:
the strongest, most pronounced characteristic of the metaphysics we find in the
materialism of the ‘encyclopédistes’, is the reduction of all forms of the motion of matter to
mechanical  motion,  and  of  all  changes  in  the  universe  to  the  merely  ‘local  changes’  of  a
permanently self-identical and unchangeable matter. It is a mechanistic materialism.26
Whether in Engels’ comment or in the narrower statement about the encyclopédistes,
we are being told precisely what we would find in any history of philosophy textbook:
materialism is predominantly ‘mechanistic’, i.e. a kind of outgrowth of Cartesian mechanism,
minus the substance metaphysics which undergirds it. This purported ‘mechanistic
materialism’ is obviously shown to exist in titles such as La Mettrie’s L’Homme-Machine
(Man a Machine, 1748), which curiously no one seems to read carefully enough to notice that
it never suggests that organic, animate bodies should be ‘reduced to’ or ‘explained in terms’ of
inorganic, inanimate matter and its purportedly basic properties. But here it is not just a
historical error or imprecision at issue; there is a more deeply-rooted philosophical
presupposition (perhaps an ‘intuition’?) that materialism necessarily explains the mental, the
higher, the complex in terms of the physical, the lower, the basic.
One is reminded of the amusing anti-materialist thought-experiment conducted by the
French philosopher Raymond Ruyer in a 1933 article. He suggests that the reader imagine a
law  court  as  seen  through  the  eyes  of  a  materialist.  “The  halo  of  meanings,  essences  and
values,” in other words, everything relevant about the scene, vanishes, and what is left is the
23Boyle (1661/1999), p. 221.
24Bacon (1620/2004), I, § 124.
25 Engels (1888/1962), p. 278 (translation mine); in English in Marx & Engels (1959), p. 211.
26 Vassails (1951), p. 315, referring to the article “MOUVEMENT” (to which one can add the article
“MATIÈRE”).
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“functioning of a sort of complicated mechanics” whereby brains produce articulations, which
in turn generate vibrations in the air, and thereby modify other nervous systems.27 Everything
takes place in the present, which is made up of strictly quantifiable events; psychological or
social reality is an emanation which can always be reduced to physical processes. Basically, in
this digest of Husserl, Ruyer has already formulated the core of Putnam and Fodor’s ideas of
the 1970s: materialism is a strange kind of reductionism which denies the reality of social
institutions, values, and of course minds. Mental life is not to be approached with the
conceptual tools that might be appropriate for physical objects. It is curious that both
dialectical materialists of the old-fashioned kind (including, for present purposes, Sartre in
“Materialism and Revolution”28) and spiritualist thinkers such as Ruyer give such an identical
portrait of materialism as a historical episode.
In fact the main explanatory target of early modern materialism is biological reality.
The materialist project is inseparably linked to the project of natural history, which was the
most common name for the cluster of activities termed ‘biology’ by 1800. The philosophical
context of this project is familiar from figures such as Hume, La Mettrie and d’Holbach, who
“naturalize” domains such as religion, the soul, or the “human heart”29; even Locke described
the project of his Essay as a “History of the first beginnings of human knowledge.”30 The
“historical, plain method” he announces at the beginning of the Essay (p.  44)  is  a  way  of
naturalizing a theological topos.  In  case  it’s  not  obvious  to  us  that  natural  history  was  a
reductionist project, consider this passage from Nicolas Linguet, a conservative pamphleteer
of the 1760s who was also the author of Le Fanatisme des Philosophes (1764). Linguet
regrets that “a taste for natural history has become quite common. Rich countries are filled
with cabinets. . .  .  Look at this spectacle of Nature dead and dissected . . .”31 As is often the
case, it helps to listen to the reactionaries, for Linguet correctly perceives that natural history
or proto-biology is a strongly polemical project in the mid-eighteenth century.
One need only think of Diderot – specifically two passages in very different works,
both devoted to the then-brand new theory of biological epigenesist (according to which life,
in paradigmatic forms such as the embryo, emerges out of the adjunction of successive layers
of material substance, not through the superaddition of any ‘spirit’, ‘soul’ or preexisting
‘form’): (a) the Rêve de D’Alembert’s famous “voyez-vous cet œuf ?” and (b) the definition of
“modern Spinosists” in the Encyclopédie:
(a)
Do you see this egg? With this you can overthrow all the schools of theology, all the
churches of the world. What is this egg? An unsensing mass, prior to the introduction of the
seed [germe]; and after the seed has been introduced, what is it then? Still an unsensing mass,
for the seed itself is merely an inert, crude fluid. How will this mass develop into a different
27 Ruyer (1933), p. 28.
28 Sartre (1946/1990) reproaches materialism for eliminating “subjectivity,” “the human outlook” from
the universe (pp. 85, 99); with its “chains of blind causality” (pp. 86, 120), it is no better than
Taylorism, which reduces human action to a series of mechanically specifiable performances (pp. 127-
128).
29 d’Holbach (1999), I, xi, p. 292. The title of Diderot’s late, unfinished work, Éléments de physiologie,
appears to have been provisional (and taken from Albrecht von Haller); according to his friend and
biographer Naigeon, the work, if completed, would have been entitled Histoire naturelle et
expérimentale de l’homme (Dieckmann [1951], p. 186).
30 Locke (1975), II.xi.15.
31 Linguet, Annales politiques, civiles, et littéraires du XVIIIe siècle (1777), quoted in Metzger (1987),
p. 247, n. 4.
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[level of] organisation, to sensitivity and life? By means of heat. And what will produce the
heat? Motion.32
and
(b)
Spinosist: follower of the philosophy of Spinosa. One must not confuse the ancient
Spinosists with the modern Spinosists. The general principle of the latter is that matter is
sensitive; they demonstrate this by the development of the egg, an inert body which by the
sole means [instrument] of graduated heat moves to the state of a sensing, living being, and by
the growth of any animal which in its inception [principe] is merely a point, and through the
nutritive assimilation of plants and – in one word – of all substances that serve the purpose of
nutrition, becomes a great sensing and living body in a greater [expanse of] space. From this
they conclude that only matter exists, and that it is sufficient to explain everything. For the
rest, they follow ancient Spinosism in all of its consequences.33
Briefly put, Diderot in the first text states the implications of the new biological theory,
and in the second text attributes this new theory to those he calls, intriguingly ‘modern
Spinosists’. He distinguishes between ‘ancient Spinosists’, who are substance monists and
metaphysicians overall, and ‘modern Spinosists’, for whom the key phenomenon is biological
epigenesis, and who assert that matter is fundamentally living matter. In addition, Diderot
thinks mechanistic science is over and done with, a thing of the past, a completed cycle:
We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the taste people seem to
have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of nature and experimental physics, I dare say that
before a hundred years, there will not be more than three great geometricians remaining in
Europe. The science will stop short where the Bernoullis, the Eulers, the Maupertuis, the
Clairaut, the Fontaines and the D’Alemberts will have left. . . . We will not go beyond.34
Diderot is opposing the new ‘taste’ and interest for a set of preoccupations including
two forms of ‘life science’ (natural history and ‘experimental physics’) to the traditional
prestige of mathematical science. And he is squarely locating his materialist preoccupations,
as we saw in the earlier quotations, within the former.
Indeed, materialism is so far from being mechanistic that it borders on the vitalistic …
(and the same contrarian view or treatment can be applied to vitalism itself in this period,
which turns out not to be a metaphysics of vital forces, but a heuristic, explanatory vitalism
seeking to model complex phenomena to arrive at laws or at least regularities of organic
life35). Key concepts such as organisation and économie animale, which are used to describe
organic functions and structural integrity in ways which are not strictly or completely
mechanistic, are explicitly devised in contradistinction to mechanistic explanations of vital
processes; even a work with a title like L’Homme-Machine never reduces the living body to
inorganic mechanical models.36 In this one can speak of a ‘vital materialism’, with the proviso
that this becomes more the norm than the exception (i.e., it is not that most forms of
materialism are mechanistic and then exceptionally a Diderot or a La Mettrie articulate a
uniquely ‘vital’ materialism; one can also think back to Lucretius’ semina rerum and their
revival with Gassendi).
32Rêve de D’Alembert, in Diderot (1994), p. 618; cf. pp. 706-707.
33  s.v. “Spinosistes,” Encyclopédie XV, 474 / Diderot (1994), p. 484.
34 Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature § 4, in Diderot (1994), p. 561.
35See Kaitaro (2008), Wolfe and Terada (2008).
36See Wolfe (forthcoming 2010).
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Vital materialism gets rediscovered every few years, especially in Anglophone history
of ideas which tends to have a marked culturalist emphasis and an equally marked lack of
concern with the history of philosophy. The most recent work to present a ‘vitalized’ version
of materialism as a novelty is Peter Hans Reill’s Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment; some
years earlier, it was Timothy Lenoir’s Strategy of Life.37 In fact, talk of vital materialism goes
at  least  far  back as  the 1960s,  with Jean Wahl  or  Maurice Got.  Wahl  describes Diderot  as  a
“vitalist materialist” and the Leibnizian philosopher of nature Jean-Baptiste Robinet as a
“materialist vitalist”; Got speaks of the “received opinion” according to which “materialism
and mechanism are identical,” and declares that all writings of the period, notably those of
Diderot, contradict this opinion.38
At  which  point  can  one  speak  of  vital  materialism  as  a  set  of  claims  which  is
differentiated from other natural-philosophical positions? A safe initial boundary marker
would with the seventeenth-century English physician Francis Glisson and the eighteenth-
century Swiss physiologist Albrecht von Haller, who both contributed to articulate the idea
that organic matter possesses certain essential properties such as irritability and sensitivity;39
an additional characteristic of vital materialism is, of course, a marked shift in the concept of
matter itself, from a Cartesian/Galilean/Newtonian understanding40 to  an  ‘animate’  vision
which one finds notably in John Toland’s Letters to Serena (1704), in which the strong
distinction between matter and motion is rejected. The fifth letter is explicitly entitled Motion
essential to Matter,41 and in it Toland states that “All the Matter in Nature, every Part and
Parcel of it, has bin ever in motion, and can never be otherwise” ( Toland [1704/1976, ] p.
167), and “there’s but one sort of Matter in the Universe” (ibid., p. 174), in a ceaseless process
of transformation: “All the Parts of the Universe are in this constant Motion of destroying and
begetting, of begetting and destroying ” (ibid.,  p.  188).  Matter  is  not  just  in  some  sort  of
‘intestine’ motion (Toland speaks later on of its “autokinesy”), it is also fundamentally,
inherently active: “Activity ought toenter into the Definition of Matter, it ought likewise to
express the Essence thereof” (ibid.,  p.  165).  Toland  assures  the  reader  that  it  is  the  all-
powerful God himself who, in his perfection, created matter as active (and not merely
extended) (ibid., pp. 234-235).
This vital materialism is thus not just a mid- to late eighteenth century ‘French
materialist’ phenomenon; while it’s true that Diderot’s masterpiece Le Rêve de D’Alembert
(D’Alembert’s Dream) features a vitalist physician, Bordeu, as its ‘hero’, various other texts
such as the works of the Francis Glisson, Toland as seen above, the anonymous clandestine
manuscriptL’âme matérielle, etc., show this trend, in other countries and in the seventeenth
century.
What does it change about the picture of doctrines? Consider what we would today call
theory reduction and physicalism. These are both standard traits of any form of materialism in
the twentieth (or twenty-first) century. Materialism in this sense is a reductionist theory (or
37 Reill (2005); Lenoir (1982). An original insight of Reill’s is that this ‘vitalized’ vision of the
Enlightenment should not be confused with the Naturphilosophie tradition, indeed is opposed to it
(Reill [2005], pp. 14, 200, 235), notably because there is no ontological claim made for the existence of
unique, irreducible vital forces in the former.
38 Wahl (1962), pp. 53, 54; Got (1962), p. 137.
39 Giglioni (2008).
40 Obviously these are different understandings, particularly if one considers the Cartesian definition of
matter as extension versus the Newtonian integration of the concept of force; but – if we disregard very
complex debates on whether Newton might have considered gravity to be a property of matter,
something he denies explicitly – they share an unwillingness to make matter itself be the bearer of
complex additional properties such as motion, sensation and ultimately thought.
41Toland (1704/1976), p. 163f.
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meta-theory) in which higher-level claims, notably psychological, are reduced to lower-level
entities and/or theories – notably, or even exclusively physical. In contrast, what we find in
the ‘vital materialism’ discussed here is a kind of reductionism without physics. Not only is
there historically no physics to reduce a higher-level theory to, but recall Diderot’s rather
unusual attitude as expressed above: the mathematical sciences are complete, now we move
on to the life sciences. Another interesting effect of this kind of materialism is to generate a
concept of ‘material soul’ (as in the title of the anonymous clandestine treatise from 1700,
L’âme matérielle), in other words a proto-psychology.
3. Conclusion
It is a bit disappointing for major categories in the interpretation of early modern
thought (or, for some, of philosophy tout court) to be dispensed with in favour of a situation in
which the interpreter simply says ‘it’s complicated’; should we then only speak of Socinians,
Hobbists, neo-Stahlians or analogical Newtonians? (All of which are legitimate categories that
distinguish different strands of early modern radical thought, within ‘empiricism’ and
‘materialism’; hence Locke or Spinoza might profitably be thought of as belonging to
Socinian debates; Diderot’s theory of matter and life is heavily influenced by Georg-Ernest
Stahl; Hartley has a ‘Newtonian’, but analogically Newtonian model of the nervous system;
etc.) So I shall not conclude merely by recommending the denial of the old historiography;
rather, I think it makes sense to speak of Locke as an empiricist or Diderot as a materialist,
on the condition that we take care to not use nineteenth- or early twentieth-century definitions
as  if  they  were  Gospel  truth.  To  understand  in  what  way  Locke  was  an  empiricist  or  La
Mettrie a materialist is not to cease to understand them philosophically!42
What does it mean to think of empiricism and materialism differently, if it is not just a
fragmentation of categories? One modification would be that they not be considered as rough
drafts of a completed doctrine that came into its own in the twentieth century; they are not ‘on
the way’, unterwegs to  Kant  or  Russell.  This  is  not  just  a  plea  for  the  significance  of
intellectual history, because it makes a philosophical difference: for instance when we cease
to view Locke or Hume’s projects as ‘epistemology’ in the restrictive sense. In fact thinkers
before Kant do not speak of ‘objectivity’ but rather of ‘impartiality’43; they do not separate
ethical matters and epistemological matters as we would now. Rather,
(i) empiricism is a morally motivated program, and somewhat constructivist in its
‘epistemology’ – hence its engendering of Hume, which otherwise makes very little sense; in
addition, as Michael Ayers observed, it is “notoriously weak in its philosophy of
experiment”44;
(ii) far from being mechanistic, materialism needs to be understood in much more
‘vital’ terms.45 In case this claim seems non-controversial, consider the recent, presumably
representative reference work, the Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science,
which contains an article entitled “Materialism and vitalism,” in which the two are opposed:
“Materialists make the ultimate principles matter and motion; vitalists, the soul or an
irreducible life force.”46
42Yet the revisionist view of certain key early modern philosophical ‘positions’ or ‘constellations of
ideas’ suggested here goes a lot further than some recent proposals for revising ‘analytic history of
philosophy’ (namely, Sorell & Rogers, eds. (2005)), without however insisting on pure ‘contextualism’.
43Thanks to Dario Perinetti (UQAM, Montréal) for pointing this out to me. See also Gaukroger (2005).
44 Ayers (1991), vol. 2, p. 159.
45 This is not true of Hobbes or Hartley. However, in the British context it is true of the group of
materialist physicians known as the ‘mortalists’, in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. See Thomson
(2000) and (2008).
46 Wellman (2003); see Kaitaro (2008).
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To put it differently, Locke is not interested in the physical basis of ideas; similarly,
Hume’s  science  of  human  nature  is  a moral science in which passions are the ‘simples’ or
‘primitives’, the building-blocks, which do not reduce to anything further (that would be the
anatomist’s job, Hume says), and his epistemology is significantly derived from his moral
theory.47 Second, this kind of non-reducibility also appears in Diderot’s biologically driven
materialism, which does not reduce to physics. The same could be shown for early modern
determinism (i.e. that it is not Laplacian, focusing on calculability and predictability, but
action-centred and embodied).48
A question I leave open is whether the revisionist/contrarian view presented here severs
the link between empiricism and materialism – for the ‘moral’, non-epistemological
foundation of empiricism seems to put it on a different track than our linkage of it to
materialism, and the emphasis on the ‘vital’ dimension of materialism would tend to link it to
a tradition including Van Helmont, Glisson and Leibniz rather than that of, say, Hobbes.
Regardless, I hope to have illustrated both a general claim that certain characteristics of
philosophical positions require some historical attention to be made sense of in their own
internal terms, and a specific claim concerning the status of empiricism and materialism, with
consequences also for our understanding of the relation between philosophy and science in the
early modern and Enlightenment periods.
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